

- 17:4-5 self-understanding
The notion that philosophy involves self-understanding descends from Socrates, especially his emphasis in the *Apology* upon the examined life. He, in turn, might have been indebted to the popular wisdom embodied in the inscription on the temple of the Delphic Oracle: Know Thyself.
Gilbert Kyle's essay "Thinking and Self-Teaching" (*Thinking* 1, nos. 3-4) contains interesting insights into the relationship between thinking about thinking and self-understanding.
- 17:11-13 basic sentences and simple language
It is not so long ago that I. A. Richards advocated the construction of a simple language in his book *Basic English*. We should also remember that the Vienna Circle in the 1920s stood for the creation of an ideal language, as opposed to everyday language. See Rudolf Carnap, *The Syntax of Logical Language*, as well as Richard Korty, *The Linguistic Turn*.
- 17:23-29 all and some
Harry's problem with quantification is a familiar one to logicians. Among those who have dealt with it are Peter Strawson in his *Introduction to Logical Theory*, Fred Sommers in *The Logic of Natural Language*, and W. V. Quine in such works as *Elementary Logic* and "Logic as a Source of Syntactical Insights" in *The Ways of Paradox*.
- 19:5 Dale's mistake
Dale's comment is characteristic of literal-minded students who find it difficult to make counterfactual assumptions or to treat examples as merely examples.
- 19:14-19 the four logical propositions
One of the most reliable modern treatments of propositions is in Cohen and Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (ch. 2, "An Analysis of Propositions").
- 19:26-27 "there's no fact"
This theme is a variant of Kant's remark that "the two most important things in the world are the starry skies above us, and the moral law within us." Both make a claim as to the equivalence of mind and nature. The comment does lend itself to a dualistic interpretation, as opposed to the naturalistic unity of mind and nature that one finds in Spinoza and Dewey.
- 20:1-5 jumping to conclusions
Harry is a bit superstitious in Chapter Two and quite uncritical in Chapter Four. On the basis of very little evidence, he has the thought that Tony threw the stone. In this, he undoubtedly jumps to a conclusion, or commits "the fallacy of hasty generalization," where one generalizes from too few cases. See W. W. Fears and W. B. Holther, *Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument*, pp. 13-14.

CHAPTER FIVE

References and Sources

- 21:1 continuity between thinkers
The last paragraph of Chapter Four begins with the same word, "grown-ups," as the first paragraph of Chapter Five. Virginia Woolf uses this device to show the continuity between what individual minds are thinking. See her *Mrs. Dalloway* or *To the Lighthouse*. Sartre employs a similar technique in his novel *Les Chemins de la liberté*.
- 21:3-7 jobs and role distance
Whether people can say or do things they don't mean when they are in a given job depends on how much they distance themselves from their jobs or roles. Erving Goffman discusses the problem of role distance in *Encounters* and in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. In the latter, he takes up the question of performances and analyzes their effect on one's belief in the part one is playing.
- 21:8-9 disagreeing and not knowing why
Plato likes to distinguish between holding a correct opinion without knowing one's reasons for holding it and knowing the reasons why one holds such an opinion. See *The Republic*, bk. 7, 532-34.
- 21:10-11 Is Harry sexist?
Harry offers some candles to Maria "almost as an afterthought." It is as if Maria weren't initially present. Whether this is a case of sexism or merely "selective inattention" is open for question.
- 21:13-24 moving from one to all
The thinking moves from one course (history) not being good, to Harry's "some courses are good and some aren't," to "None of the courses are any good. They are all bad." Mark moves from one particular history course to all courses, whether observed or not. This is the fallacy of hasty generalization, in which an isolated or exceptional case is used as the basis for a general conclusion that is unwarranted. In his discussion of this fallacy in *With Good Reason*, S. Morris Engel offers a comparable example: "I had a bad time with my former husband. From that experience, I've learned that all men are no good." Maria points out Mark's fallacy in lines 23 and 24.
- 21:25 Mark's remark
Mark says, "It doesn't mean it. They just are." Maria seems to have accused Mark of a fallacy of inference. His reply is that he is not inferring that they are all bad. He is stating that they are bad as a matter of fact. He's denying that it is a fallacy. The obvious response to what he is saying is that he has not observed all courses. Perhaps what Mark is insinuating is that courses in school are a natural kind and all have the same essential characteristics.

tic—being boring. In other words, if you have seen one, you have seen them all.

Maria infers that if some courses are not interesting, there must be others that *are* interesting. Under ordinary circumstances, this would be an invalid inference. In a situation in which each instance has been identified and enumerated, however, it may be possible for "some x are not" to imply "some x are y." For example, if a teacher has finished grading all the examinations and is asked if everyone passed, she may reply, "Some didn't." It would be legitimate to infer, in this case, that "some did." But if she hadn't yet graded all the papers, the inference would be invalid.

Are there physical correlates of cognitive experiences? For example, does standing on one's head have anything to do with turning sentences around? Mark Johnson, in *The Body and the Mind*, holds that there are many "schemas" (a term he takes from Kant) in which particular bodily behaviors function so as to connect percepts and concepts.

In the Talmudic tradition, there is a dialectical move of turning one's opponent's argument upside down. In fact, this is what Karl Marx says he did to Fichte's dialectic: He stood it on its *Spitze*.

For a highly influential version of induction, see David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, sec. 4, part 2, and sec. 5, part 1. Karl Popper has provided a helpful commentary in his article "Hume's Explanation of Inductive Inference," in Alexander Sesonske and N. Flenning, eds., *Human Understanding: Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume*. See also the article by P. F. Strawson, "The Justification of Induction," in the same volume. And see Cohen and Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method*, pp. 279–86.

Jumping to conclusions is another example of hasty generalization. In psychological literature, it is generally referred to as *stereotyping*. See D. L. Hamilton, ed., *Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior*. Mark says that "all the classes in this school are awful. It's an awful school!" Students might wonder if this is valid part-whole reasoning.

Mark accuses the schools of being authoritarian. See Theodor Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*.

The source of this is the cynical remark by Thrasymachus in *The Republic*, bk. 1, 336b–347e. See also Nietzsche (*The Genealogy of Morals and Beyond Good and Evil*), who develops a theory in which instinctive behavior is

conceded by calling it its opposite. Nietzsche's theory postulates two moralities, one of the leaders and the other of the followers. Whatever the strong do is called good. One can also look in Freud's writings for his theory of *reaction-formation*. He suggests that one masks one's aggressive or libidinal instincts by converting them into their opposites; see *The Ego and the Id*.

In Plato's *Republic* (bk. 1), Thrasymachus argues that we entrust specialized tasks to experts rather than to laymen and that these experts are infallible in what they do (since one would cease to be an expert at the moment of making a mistake.) Socrates does not wholly disagree with him, but tries to show that the expert or professional acts not from self-interest but in the interest of his client (336b–347e). Maria, analogously, argues that grown-ups rather than children must run the schools because they possess the necessary expertise that children do not.

The difference between Thrasymachus and Socrates is that although both are antidemocratic, Thrasymachus is prepared to condone powerful self-interested authority, whereas Socrates argues for an enlightened elitism in which the rulers would take their professionalism seriously and act in behalf of the people they serve. Maria evidently accepts Socrates' position.

Mark says, "things wouldn't be any worse than they are now." He rejects the authoritarianism of Thrasymachus and the enlightened elitism of Socrates, suggesting that things couldn't be worse if the people were to rule themselves, or if the children were to run the schools. See Locke and Jefferson in political theory and A. S. Neill, *Summerhill*, in education. (Of course there is a difference between Locke and Jefferson, who favored representative democracy, and the idea of children directly assuming authority in running the schools.)

Harry seems to side with Maria and Socrates rather than with Mark, whose proposal seems too drastic for him. Harry argues, like Socrates in the passage just cited, that the real issue is whether or not those in power know what they are doing. Of course, Socrates would go further than this and demand that they act for the people and not for themselves.

With regard to people who understand not only children but why we are in school in the first place, see Sylvia Ashton-Warner, *Teacher*. With regard to the concept of understanding, see Stephen Toulmin, *Knowledge and Understanding*.

For someone who is very close to this position, see E. D. Hirsch, Jr., *Cultural Literacy*. Hirsch is an example of an educator who thinks that certain contents must

21:26–27

Maria's inference

22:2–3

Mark's standing on his head

22:4–20

induction

22:20

jumping to conclusions

22:29

part-whole reasoning

23:8–9

authoritarianism

23:13–15

"they'll call it good, no matter what they do"

23:16–22

Maria's speech

23:23–25

Mark's reply

23:26–29

Harry's position

24:1–5

knowing what they're doing as understanding

24:8

education as learning answers

be learned by all schoolchildren. In general, however, the position that one goes to school to learn answers is seldom formulated theoretically and defended. Nevertheless, it is a prime maxim of traditional educational practice.

In *How We Think*, Dewey argues that there is a continuity between problem solving in everyday life and problem solving in scientific inquiry. He goes so far as to depict a series of stages through which inquiry proceeds in each case. Dewey's formulation of the stages of problem solving has been interpreted by innumerable educators as a paradigm for education. In recent years the process of problem solving has been systematized and presented as an essential characteristic of education. See, for example, John R. Hayes, *The Complete Problem Solver*, 2d ed., and Arthur Whimby and Jack Lockhead, *Problem-Solving and Comprehension*, 3d ed.

See Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Philosophy as Interrogation," in *Themes from the Lectures*, pp. 99-113. See also Felix Cohen, "What Is a Question?" *Thinking* 4, nos. 3-4, and Arthur C. Graesser and John B. Black, *The Psychology of Questions*. Robin Collingwood has also written about the relationship of questions to answers in his *Autobiography*.

See Robert Glaser, "Education and Thinking," *American Psychologist* (February 1984), and Dewey, "Education as Thinking," ch. 12 of *Democracy and Education*. Also see John Stuart Mill, "Inaugural Address at St. Andrews"; Alfred North Whitehead, *The Aims of Education*; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile*; John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University*; and Richard and Maria Edgeworth, *Practical Education*, 3 vols. (1802).

Kant uses the phrase "thinking for oneself" in his *Logic*, and in his essay "On Enlightenment" he discusses intellectual autonomy in the sense that it is shameful to have other people do our thinking for us. There is also a discussion of thinking for oneself as autonomy in Paul Hirst, "Education and Diversity of Belief," in M. C. Felderhof, ed., *Religious Education in a Pluralist Society* (1985). One of the main aims of Philosophy for Children is to help children think for themselves, as discussed in Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan, *Philosophy in the Classroom*, 2d ed., pp. 82-84 and 203-4. Also see Philip C. Guin, "Thinking for Oneself," in this book.

See John Wilson, "Making Subjects Interesting," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 21, no. 2 (1987): 215-22. See also T. S. Champlain, "Doing Something for Its Own Sake," *Philosophy* 62 (1987); Michael Oakeshott, "Edi-

cation: The Engagement and Its Frustration," in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst, and R. S. Peters, eds., *Education and the Development of Reason*; and John Dewey, *Experience and Education and Democracy and Education* (chs. 10 and 15).

Cf. Wittgenstein's notion of "seeing as" in *Philosophical Investigations*. The whole theory of Rorschach analysis, in which the patient's associations with visual forms are analyzed, is most insightfully discussed by Ernst Kris in *Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art* and by Ernest Schachtel in *Metamorphosis*.

One of the first things translators quite properly do with this section is to substitute the contours of their own country for North America. Otherwise, the imperialistic connotations of this passage becomes overwhelming. See Rudolf Arnheim, *Visual Thinking*, and E. H. Gombrich, *Meditations on a Hobby Horse*.

The notion of idea as perception is richly developed in Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Harry recognizes an analogy between Mark's experience of the cloud and Mrs. Halsey's analysis of his essay. The analogy is something like: The cloud we see as North America is to our understanding of the universe as the actual cloud is to the actual universe.

See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (bk. 1), "Philosophy begins in wonder," and G. K. Chesterton, "The Ethics of Elfhand," reprinted in *Thinking* 1, no. 2.

See Wittgenstein, "A Lecture on Ethics," reprinted in *Discovering Philosophy*; Ninian Smart, *Philosophers and Religious Truth*; and George Santayana, *Secularism and Animal Faith*. See also Santayana, "Ultimate Religion," which appears in *Other Scripts*. This is a main theme in Dewey's *Art as Experience*.

In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche analyzes mental activity into Apollonian intellect and Dionysian ecstatic reverie. He talks of how these two come together in Socrates.

CHAPTER SIX

References and Sources

This tone poem by Paul Dukas is familiar to children through the Disney movie *Fantasia*. Perhaps there is an analogy: The sorcerer's apprentice has unleashed the

25:16-20

the cloud

25:23

our idea

26:4-6

the wonder-
ful

26:5-6

the won-
der of the
everyday

26:7

getting ex-
cited by
one's own
ideas

Page, Line

Theme

27:3-6

The
Sorcerer's
Apprentice

24:20-25:7

making
school inter-
esting

24:15-16

education
as learning
to think for
oneself

24:14-15

education as
learning how
to think

24:12-13

education
as asking
questions